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NO SMOKE AND NO FIRE: THE RISE OF INTERNAL 
CONTROLS ABSENT ANTI-BRIBERY VIOLATIONS IN 
FCPA ENFORCEMENT 
Karen E. Woody† 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits bribery of foreign public 
officials in order to obtain or retain business. It is, for all intents and purposes, an 
anti-bribery statute. To detect bribery, the FCPA contains accounting provisions 
related to bookkeeping and internal controls. The books and records provision 
requires issuers to make and maintain accurate books, records, and accounts; 
likewise, the internal controls provision requires that issuers devise and maintain 
reasonable internal accounting controls aimed at preventing and detecting FCPA 
violations. If one considers the analogy that bribery is the “fire” in FCPA enforcement 
actions, and books and records violations are the “smoke,” internal controls are the 
“smoke detectors.” 
The government is increasingly punishing, or threatening to punish, companies 
for the potential ineffectiveness of these “smoke detectors.” Internal controls 
violations arguably are not substantive violations, but instead are violations arising 
out of the potential for other violations. The recent increase in the number of 
enforcement actions alleging violations of the internal controls provision in the 
absence of any correlating anti-bribery provision violations suggests that enforcement 
of the Act has (d)evolved to a place well beyond its stated purpose. Additionally 
problematic is that the internal controls required by the FCPA are not a fixed 
standard but instead a fairly ambiguous set of recommendations and guidelines that 
depend on the characteristics of each company and industry. The result of this is 
overcriminalization and overenforcement of the statute by the government, and 
overcompliance by the private sector. This Article addresses the alarming shift in the 
interpretation of the breadth of the statute by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and discusses the vast 
theoretical ramifications of this overcriminalization and overenforcement. 
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of 
Business. The author would like to thank Phil Nichols, Kevin Kolben, Abbey Stemler, Todd 
Haugh, Jamie Prenkert, Leigh Anenson, Dan Cahoy, Lynda Oswald, Caroline Kaeb, and Angie 
Raymond for their invaluable advice and edits, and Amy Dillard for her continual support. 
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Consider the following increasingly common scenario. You are a 
young partner at a large law firm. Your client is a multinational 
company, headquartered in the United States but with numerous 
subsidiaries around the globe. Nearly five years ago, you helped the 
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company establish a rigorous anti-corruption compliance program, 
complete with an anti-corruption hotline, risk assessment matrices by 
geographical area, and anti-corruption policies available in every 
language in which the company transacts around the world. You 
personally have delivered training sessions for the company executives 
on anti-corruption measures, and established company-wide training 
modules that every employee, regardless of rank, must complete 
quarterly. Recently, the company has informed you that the SEC has 
inquired about a particular shipping contract between your Kazakh 
subsidiary and the customs agent at a port in Russia. You mobilize an 
army of attorneys to engage in a full-scale investigation into the 
contract. The company, per its anti-corruption policies, has already 
done extensive due diligence on the customs agent prior to entering the 
contract. Nevertheless, you and your associates perform interviews of 
every employee involved in the contract, from the CEO of the subsidiary 
down to the employees off-loading containers at the port. Thousands of 
attorney hours are spent hunting down any possible soupcon of bribery 
or potential slush fund, and the company spends millions in attorneys’ 
fees ensuring that every rock is overturned. The company takes great 
pains to be sure that it complies with every government request, both 
for documents and availability of employees for interviews. After a 
multi-year investigation, you discover the terms and the performance of 
the contract at issue are legitimate. No bribes have been made; no slush 
funds created. Despite the enormous fees associated with the 
investigation, the company executives are pleased to find that there is no 
malfeasance occurring. 
The SEC, for its part, agrees with your law firm’s investigation’s 
findings. Your firm closes the books on another investigation, satisfied 
that it met its legal duty to your client. A few months later, however, the 
SEC calls to tell you that your client will be facing internal controls 
violations. Baffled that you are receiving this call rather than a no-action 
letter from the agency, you ask what the basis for the allegation is. The 
Enforcement Division attorney explains that there could have been some 
books and records, or even bribery, issues in the company’s Kazakh 
subsidiary. After all, she explains, it took years to determine that there 
were not any, and that fact alone gave the regulator some pause. In other 
words, the agency concedes that the company did not engage in any 
bribery, nor did it have any books and records inaccuracies. Its internal 
controls, however, were not as robust as they likely should have been. 
She begins to suggest days to have you and the client come in to discuss 
next steps. 
The above scenario is becoming increasingly common, and 
provides a troubling example of routine overextension of the FCPA 
beyond its original breadth and purpose. Although much ink has been 
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spilled in the academic literature on the FCPA,1 including debate over 
whether the statute as a whole is overenforced,2 this Article’s 
contribution to the literature is that it critiques the enforcement of the 
internal controls provision of the Act in isolation, analyzing the very 
recent trend in enforcement of the internal controls provision absent 
anti-bribery violations. 
This Article explores the purpose of the internal controls provision, 
highlights the recent enforcement actions that have included an internal 
controls charge absent a bribery charge, and discusses the threat of 
broader internal controls prosecutions against companies and 
individuals. Part I details the history of the statute and the modern rise 
in enforcement actions since 2000. In Part II, this Article outlines three 
recent enforcement actions for violations of only the accounting 
provisions of the FCPA, underscoring the real cause for concern in the 
overenforcement and the broad reading of the statute by the 
government regulators. In Part III, this Article addresses the theoretical 
problems with overenforcement of the statute, leading to both 
overcompliance and overcriminalization that stray from the original 
purposes of the Act. In addition, this Part discusses that the lack of any 
standard for internal controls allows for a lack of uniformity in both 
investigating violations and enforcing punishment. Finally, Part IV 
discusses the future of FCPA enforcement in light of this growing trend 
of overcriminalization and overenforcement of the statute beyond its 
original intent. 
I.     HISTORY OF THE FCPA 
In 1977, Congress passed the FCPA,3 aimed at eradicating bribery 
occurring overseas for the purpose of obtaining business. Specifically, 
the FCPA prohibits the corrupt use of the mail or any other 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of any offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of money or 
any other thing of value to any person, knowing that all or some of the 
payment will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a 
 
 1 See, e.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1447 (2008); Mike Koehler, The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery 
Enforcement, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 525 (2015); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A 
Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997). These 
are just a few of the many exceptional pieces discussing various aspects of the FCPA. 
 2 See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. 
CORP. L. 325 (2013). 
 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)). 
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foreign official to influence or induce the foreign official to either 
commit an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure an 
improper advantage in obtaining or retaining business.4 In addition to 
the anti-bribery provision, the FCPA also includes accounting 
provisions. Among the FCPA accounting provisions, the books and 
records provision requires issuers to make and maintain accurate books, 
records, and accounts.5 Likewise, the internal controls provision 
requires that issuers devise and maintain reasonable internal accounting 
controls aimed at preventing and detecting FCPA violations.6 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC jointly enforce both the anti-
bribery and the accounting provisions. 
A.     Legislative History 
The impetus for this legislation was that in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal, the SEC set out to investigate questionable corporate 
payments that were often disguised on the corporate books and 
records.7 As a result of its extensive “questionable payments” 
investigation, the SEC discovered over 400 companies had made 
questionable payments totaling over $300 million to foreign officials.8 
Notably, the SEC was chiefly concerned with the accuracy of the 
corporate books and records, rather than the fact that the payments 
went to foreign officials.9 In its summary of the investigation, the SEC 
proposed legislation aimed at shoring up corporate accountability, but 
declined to address the issues of foreign corruption or bribery. 
Specifically, the SEC suggested that Congress pass legislation that would 
(1) prohibit the falsification of corporate books and records, (2) prohibit 
corporate executives and agents from making false or misleading 
 
 4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a). 
 5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
 6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 7 See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 269 (1998); see also 
Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929 (2012). 
Sporkin stated that as he watched the Watergate scandal unfold on television, he wondered how 
the corporations involved put the illegal payments on their books and records. Sporkin, supra 
at 271. As then-Commissioner of the SEC, Sporkin set out to investigate the breadth of 
potentially illegal corporate payments. Id. 
 8 See Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United 
States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902–03 (2005). 
 9 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REP. OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, at b (Comm. Print 1976) (“[T]he primary thrust of our actions has 
been to restore the efficacy of the system of corporate accountability . . . .”). 
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statements to auditors, and (3) mandate that corporate management 
establish and maintain adequate accounting controls such that 
corporate transactions are properly recorded.10 
The Senate Report sparking the FCPA, however, explains that 
foreign policy was the primary congressional reason for the passage of 
the FCPA.11 Specifically, the Senate Report stated: 
  Bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations . . . creates severe 
foreign policy problems. The revelations of improper payments 
invariably tends to embarrass friendly regimes and lowers the esteem 
for the United States among the foreign public. It lends credence to 
the worse suspicions sown by extreme nationalists or Marxists that 
American businesses operating in their country have a corrupting 
influence on their political systems. It increases the likelihood that 
when an angry citizenry demands reform, the target will be not only 
the corrupt local officials, but also the United States and U.S. owned 
business.  
  Bribery by U.S. companies also undermines the foreign policy 
objective of the United States to promote democratically accountable 
governments and professionalized civil services in developing 
countries.12 
In addition to foreign policy concerns, congressional members 
expressed the need for better business ethics, and a sense of morality in 
foreign corporate transactions.13 In other words, there was a motivation 
among legislators that the United States should be a global leader in 
prohibiting corruption.14 Representative Solarz stated during the 1975 
House hearing on the FCPA that  
what is at stake here is really, in a number of significant respects, the 
reputation of our own country, and I think that we have an 
obligation to set a standard of honesty and integrity in our business 
dealings not only at home but also abroad which will be a beacon for 
the light of integrity for the rest of the world.15 
 
 10 Id. at 58–59. 
 11 S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 3–4 (1976); see also Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign 
Policy, 15 NEV. L.J. 297, 305–06 (2014). 
 12 S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 3–4. 
 13 See Koehler, supra note 7. Koehler outlines the pressures and motivations of 
congressional members prior to the FCPA enactment, and highlights the different aims of the 
SEC, DOJ, Congress, and the State Department with respect to the statute. Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 943–44 (citing The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th 
Cong. 35 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, Member, Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy 
of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations)). 
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In other words, the primary goal and original intent of the FCPA 
was prevention of bribery abroad. Transparency of corporate books and 
records is the means by which companies assure that foreign bribery is 
not occurring. Internal controls, in tandem with transparent books and 
records, are meant to ensure that bribery will not and cannot occur. As 
will be explored in more depth below, the enforcement of the Act seems 
to have evolved to a place where enforcement of the accounting 
provisions in the absence of any bribery, or threat of bribery, has taken 
center stage. This evolution of prosecutorial methods and enforcement 
actions is troubling on a theoretical, procedural, and practical level. 
B.     The Evolution of SEC Enforcement of FCPA Violations 
Although enacted in 1977, the FCPA was a very sleepy statute—in 
terms of enforcement—until the 2000s. From its enactment in 1977 
until 2001, the SEC brought only nine enforcement actions under the 
FCPA.16 Since those original cases, the FCPA industry, which includes 
both regulators and defense counsel, has enjoyed a boom that to date 
has not waned. In 2001 alone, the SEC brought five enforcement 
actions, including one administrative proceeding.17 In 2007, as an 
example, the SEC’s enforcement actions under the FCPA rose to 
eighteen.18 In 2010, the SEC created a specialized unit in its 
Enforcement Division, devoted solely to FCPA matters.19 Likewise, in 
2010, the agency brought fifteen enforcement actions.20 The number of 
enforcement actions per year has remained at least eight every year 
since. 21 
The fines associated with FCPA violations rose as quickly as the 
number of enforcement actions. The largest fine associated with an 
 
 16 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). Note that this list 
includes only the SEC enforcement actions and not the parallel DOJ proceedings that occurred 
in many of these cases. 
 17 Id. The administrative proceeding was brought against Chiquita Brands International. Id. 
Two major cases in 2001 included KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, and Baker Hughes 
Incorporated. Id. The SEC brought follow-on actions against individuals in both of these 
matters. Id. 
 18 Id. These cases included three administrative proceedings against Dow Chemical, Co., 
Delta & Pine Land Co. (and Turk Deltapine, Inc.), and Gioacchino De Cherico & Immucor, 
Inc. 
 19 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and 
Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2010/2010-5.htm. 
 20 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, supra note 16. 
 21 Id. 
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FCPA enforcement action was for $800 million, and was levied against 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft in 2008.22 The following six largest fines are 
as follows: $772 million against Alstom (2014);23 $579 million against 
KBR/Halliburton (2009);24 $519 million against Teva Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd. (2016);25 $419 million against Braskem/Odebrecht 
(2016);26 $412 million against Och-Ziff (2016);27 and $400 million 
against BAE (2010).28 These amounts represent the aggregate of fines 
and penalties paid to both the DOJ and SEC.  
Just as the number of enforcement actions and the fines associated 
with them have risen, so too have enforcement actions that allege 
violations of only the accounting provisions, which include the books 
and records provision and the internal controls provision.29 Since 2010, 
the percentage of enforcement actions that did not allege or find anti-
bribery violations has hovered near fifty percent.30 In 2011, eight out of 
the thirteen FCPA enforcement actions did not find, or even allege, anti-
 
 22 SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Siemens AG, 
Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 2911, 94 SEC Docket 2869 (Dec. 15, 
2008); see also Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 
2008) [hereinafter Siemens Complaint]; Richard L. Cassin, Och-Ziff Takes Fourth Spot on Our 
New Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 4, 2016, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/
10/4/och-ziff-takes-fourth-spot-on-our-new-top-ten-list.html. 
 23 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-
bribery. 
 24 SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. 
with Related Accounting Violations, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 
2935A, 95 SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11, 2009). 
 25 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees to Pay 
More than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-
million-resolve-foreign-corrupt.  
 26 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to 
Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History 
(Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-
agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve. This total amount listed in the press release 
includes payments to Brazilian and Swiss authorities.  
 27 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No. 78989, 2016 WL 
5461964 (Sept. 29, 2016); Richard L. Cassin, Och-Ziff Settles with SEC, DOJ for $412 Million, 
FCPA BLOG (Sept. 29, 2016, 3:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/9/29/och-ziff-
settles-with-sec-doj-for-412-million.html. 
 28 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay 
$400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-
pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine. 
 29 See The SEC Frequently Alleges or Finds Only Books and Records and Internal Controls 
Violations in FCPA Enforcement Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 11, 2015), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-sec-frequently-alleges-or-finds-only-books-and-records-and-
internal-controls-violations-in-fcpa-enforcement-actions. 
 30 Id. 
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bribery violations.31 Similarly, in 2012, four of the eight SEC 
enforcement actions fell into this category.32 In 2013, three out of the 
eight enforcement actions did not allege or find anti-bribery violations, 
and in 2014, three out of seven did not.33 2015 saw a decrease in DOJ 
corporate criminal actions, but a relatively stable level of SEC 
enforcement actions.34 Given that the FCPA is an anti-bribery statute, 
the rise of enforcement actions without associated bribery charges is a 
troubling metric.35 
Of course, the statutory structure of the FCPA allows the 
government to take such an aggressive action in the absence of anti-
bribery violations. Structurally, the internal controls provisions of the 
Act are independent of the anti-bribery provisions, and independent of 
the books and records provision.36 Thus, because there is no 
requirement that a deficient control be linked to an improper payment, 
a payment that does not constitute a violation of the anti-bribery 
provisions still may lead to prosecution if it is attributable to an internal 
controls deficiency. This phenomenon is addressed below. 
II.     THE MODERN RISE OF THE INTERNAL CONTROLS CHARGE 
A.     Definition of “Internal Controls” 
How exactly does the FCPA define internal controls? Interestingly, 
the statute does not provide a strict definition but instead mandates that 
every issuer of publicly traded securities is required to file periodic 
reports with the SEC and devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: 
 
1. “transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization;” 
 
 31 Id. Those enforcement actions included Aon, Watts Water, Diageo, Comverse, Rockwell 
Automation, Ball Corp., IBM, and Tenaris. Id. 
 32 Id. These were Allianz, Oracle, Pfizer, and Orthofix. Id. 
 33 Id. In 2013, these actions included ADM, Stryker, and Philips Electronics; in 2014, these 
included Avon, Bruker, and HP. Id. 
 34 See FCPA Resolutions Hit Nine Year Low, CORP. CRIME REP. (Feb. 9, 2016, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/fcpa-resolutions-hit-ten-year-low (noting 
that although the DOJ’s criminal actions decreased in 2015, the SEC’s enforcement levels have 
remained relatively stable). 
 35 See discussion and related footnotes infra Section II.B. 
 36 Exchange Act section 13b(2)(A) is a separately chargeable provision from section 
13b(2)(B). 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
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2. “transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such 
statements, and to maintain accountability for assets;” 
3. “access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization; and” 
4. “the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences.”37 
 
Further, according to the statute, “[n]o person shall knowingly 
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal 
accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account” 
described above.38 Knowing violations of the statute can result in 
criminal liability.39 For civil liability under the SEC enforcement regime, 
there is no scienter requirement.40 
As will be discussed in depth below, there is a paucity of 
information regarding what constitutes sufficient internal controls. In 
the only judicial decision to date to discuss the provision in-depth, the 
court stated: 
  The definition of accounting controls does comprehend 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives expressed 
in it will be accomplished by the system. The concept of “reasonable 
assurances” contained in [internal control provisions] recognizes 
that the costs of internal controls should not exceed the benefits 
expected to be derived. It does not appear that either the SEC or 
Congress, which adopted the SEC’s recommendations, intended that 
the statute should require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe 
accounting control system at all costs. It appears that Congress was 
fully cognizant of the cost-effective considerations which confront 
companies as they consider the institution of accounting controls 
and of the subjective elements which may lead reasonable individuals 
to arrive at different conclusions. Congress has demanded only that 
judgment be exercised in applying the standard of reasonableness. . . . 
It is also true that the internal accounting controls provisions 
contemplate the financial principle or proportionality—what is 
material to a small company is not necessarily material to a large 
company.41 
 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 38 Id. § 78m(b)(5). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. § 78m(b)(4). 
 41 SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
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The concepts of reasonableness and proportionality are paramount 
to any discussion regarding the internal controls provision and the 
correlating fines for violations of the provision. In fact, reasonableness is 
the standard Congress adopted when assessing the adequacy of internal 
controls, rather than requiring an evaluation of materiality.42 In the 
1988 Amendments to the Act, Congress clarified that “reasonable 
assurances” should be defined as “such level of detail and degree of 
assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own 
affairs.”43 Also included in the 1988 Amendments was the “prudent 
man” standard “in order to clarify that the current standard does not 
connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision.”44 
B.     Internal Controls Violations Without Related Anti-Bribery 
Charges: “Non-FCPA FCPA Enforcement Actions”45 
Enforcement of the FCPA that does not include an anti-bribery 
charge is often considered a “non-FCPA FCPA enforcement action.”46 
In other words, enforcement of the statute without charging any anti-
bribery violation is not an action that is eradicating or punishing foreign 
bribery. As noted above, these types of enforcement actions are on the 
rise. This Section will highlight three notable SEC enforcement actions 
that suggest that the agency is moving toward enforcement of the 
internal controls provisions, both in the absence of anti-bribery 
violations and without being an add-on to a blatant books and records 
violation. 
1.     BHP Billiton 
In the BHP Billiton (BHPB) administrative proceeding in 2015, the 
SEC secured a $25 million fine at the end of a six-year investigation.47 
 
 42 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 253 (2001). 
 43 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5002, 102 
Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7)). 
 44 H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 917 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1547, 1950. 
 45 Mike Koehler, Same Alleged Legal Violations, Yet Materially Different Sanctions, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/same-alleged-legal-violations-yet-
materially-different-sanctions. 
 46 Id. 
 47 BHP Billiton Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 74998, 2015 WL 2393657, at *9 (May 20, 
2015); see also Mike Koehler, Issues to Consider from the Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement 
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The enforcement action centered around the corporate hospitality 
offered to foreign dignitaries during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.48 The 
SEC Press Release summarized the allegations as follows: 
[BHPB] failed to devise and maintain sufficient internal controls over 
its global hospitality program connected to the company’s 
sponsorship of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. BHP 
Billiton invited 176 government officials and employees of state-
owned enterprises to attend the Games at the company’s expense, 
and ultimately paid for 60 such guests as well as some spouses and 
others who attended along with them. Sponsored guests were 
primarily from countries in Africa and Asia, and they enjoyed three- 
and four-day hospitality packages that included event tickets, luxury 
hotel accommodations, and sightseeing excursions valued at $12,000 
to $16,000 per package.49 
BHPB, for its part, was aware of the bribery risks in China, and, in 
particular, those related to the Olympic hospitality, as is evident by the 
strides the company took to prevent bribery. As such, the company 
created a detailed compliance program to address the risks.50 The 
compliance program included a survey that each BHPB employee had to 
fill out for each invitee to any BHPB events.51 The survey included 
questions about the existing or expected business with the invitee, 
whether the invitation carried with it an appearance of impropriety, and 
whether the invitee was in a position to influence existing or potential 
business with BHPB, among others.52 A memorandum that referenced 
the company’s anti-bribery policies and the corporate Guide to Business 
Conduct accompanied the survey.53 The surveys had to be approved 
either by the relevant BHPB group or country president.54 Further, 
BHPB established an Ethics Panel to provide employees with advice 
regarding the invitations.55 
Despite these compliance efforts and preventative internal controls, 
the SEC cited a number of reasons why these aforementioned controls 
were insufficient to address the risks associated with the expensive travel 
and entertainment packages offered by BHPB during the Beijing 
 
Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 27, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-
the-recent-bhp-billiton-enforcement-action. 
 48 BHP Billiton, 2015 WL 2393657, at *1. 
 49 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges BHP Billiton with Violating 
FCPA at Olympic Games (May 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html. 
 50 Id.; BHP Billiton, 2015 WL 2393657, at *4. 
 51 BHP Billiton, 2015 WL 2393657, at *4.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at *5. 
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Olympics. First, the SEC noted that BHPB did not require independent 
legal or compliance review of the hospitality application forms outside 
of the business group submitting the invitation.56 Second, some 
hospitality applications were either inaccurate or incomplete.57 Third, 
although BHPB had an annual Guide to Business Conduct review and 
certification process, as well as general training, it did not provide 
specific training regarding how to fill out the hospitality forms, or 
training on how to evaluate whether an invitation complied with the 
Guide.58 Fourth, BHPB did not institute a process for updating the 
hospitality applications if the conditions changed vis-à-vis the 
government official invited.59 Finally, the hospitality applications were 
filled out by individual groups within BHPB and circulated to senior 
managers, but there was no process to determine whether the invitee 
had business with another group of BHPB.60 Based on this, the SEC 
found that the company’s “books and records,” namely, the Olympic 
hospitality applications, “did not, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect pending negotiations or business dealings between BHPB 
and government officials invited to the Olympics.”61 
The fact that the SEC could not point to any bribery, or any 
contract or business gained as a result of bribery, was not the biggest 
take-away from the BHPB enforcement action. What was novel about 
the BHPB enforcement action is that the books and records violation 
seemed to be an add-on to the internal controls violation, rather than 
the other way around (as is typical for most FCPA actions). In other 
words, it is easier for an SEC enforcement attorney to find an 
accounting misrepresentation and add on an internal controls violation 
by the principles inherent in the theory of res ipsa loquitur.62 Meaning, 
if an accounting misrepresentation occurred, there clearly was not an 
internal control that prevented or detected it.63 In the BHPB case, 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at *6. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at *9. 
 62 Res ipsa loquitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“The doctrine providing 
that, in some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an inference of 
negligence that establishes a prime facie case.”). 
 63 The Morgan Stanley Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) was an exception to this 
theory. In that case, the DOJ and SEC declined to prosecute Morgan Stanley for internal 
controls despite charging a Morgan Stanley employee for violating the FCPA’s bribery 
provisions, finding that the company had sufficient controls in place. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading 
Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-
morgan-stanley-managing-director-pleads-guilty-role-evading-internal-controls-required; 
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however, the alleged failing of an internal control system did not result 
in any accounting misrepresentations or falsified books.64 Instead, the 
SEC seemingly tacked on a books and records violation by defining the 
Olympic hospitality forms as “records.” Moreover, this case also 
represented a company that did have significant internal controls after 
identifying a specific corruption risk. Nonetheless, the SEC determined 
that the company’s control system was not robust enough. The 
theoretical, procedural, and practical implications of this agency 
interpretation and action are vast and discussed in detail below. 
2.     Oracle 
In 2012, the government took the novel position that knowledge of 
the absence of FCPA anti-bribery violations in a subsidiary is also 
considered a requirement of an internal controls program.65 In SEC v. 
Oracle Corp., the SEC charged Oracle with books and records and 
internal controls violations for failing to audit local distributors in its 
Indian subsidiary.66 Specifically, the SEC alleged in its complaint: 
  On approximately 14 occasions related to 8 different government 
contracts between 2005 and 2007, certain Oracle India employees 
created extra margins between the end user and distributor price and 
directed the distributors to hold the extra margin in side funds. 
Oracle India’s employees made these margins large enough to ensure 
a side fund existed to pay third parties. At the direction of the Oracle 
India employees, the distributor then made payments out of the side 
funds to third parties, purportedly for marketing and development 
expenses. Some of the recipients of these payments were not on 
Oracle’s approved local vendor list; indeed, some of the third parties 
did not exist and were merely storefronts. 
 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with 
FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171488702. 
 64 See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low & Tom Best, Does SEC’s Enforcement Action Against BHP 
Billiton Take the FCPA’s Accounting Provisions Too Far?, STEPTOE & JOHNSON L.L.P. (May 27, 
2015), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10482.html; Mark F. Mendelsohn et al., SEC 
Extends Application of FCPA Accounting Provisions in BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, PAUL 
WEISS (May 28, 2015), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/2946569/28may15alert.pdf. 
 65 See Complaint at 5, SEC v. Oracle Corp., No. 3:12-cv-04310 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter Oracle Complaint]. This case was settled for $2 million. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Oracle Corporation with FCPA Violations Related to Secret Side 
Funds in India (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1365171483848. 
 66 Oracle Complaint, supra note 65, at 1. 
WOODY.38.5.3 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2017  2:49 PM 
2017] N O  S MO KE  AN D  N O  FI RE  1741 
 
  Because the Oracle India employees concealed the existence of the 
side fund, Oracle did not properly account for these side funds. 
These funds constituted prepaid marketing expenses incurred by 
Oracle India and should have been recorded as an asset and rolled up 
to Oracle’s corporate books and records.67 
Importantly, the government never contended that the local 
distributors were actually making any improper payments to foreign 
officials.68 This is the reason that the SEC only charged books and 
records and internal controls violations—it did not find any evidence of 
actual bribery.69 For the same reason, there was not a parallel DOJ 
investigation. 
The Oracle case sent shockwaves across the FCPA landscape, 
particularly in the defense bar.70 Although in 2005 the SEC had issued 
an enforcement action related to distributor margin, in that action the 
SEC alleged that the parent company was aware of the high probability 
that the margin was being used for improper purposes.71 In the case of 
Oracle, the SEC did not allege that Oracle, as a parent company, even 
knew of the “side funds” that its Indian subsidiary had parked for 
payments to local distributors.72 In this instance, however, the 
government used the parent’s lack of knowledge as an indication that its 
internal controls were insufficient.73 The SEC complaint made that 
clear: 
  Oracle lacked the proper controls to prevent its employees at 
Oracle India from creating and misusing the parked funds. For 
example, Oracle knew distributor discounts created a margin of cash 
from which distributors received payments for their services. Before 
2009, however, the Company failed to audit and compare the 
 
 67 Id. at 3. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Amy L. Riella, Tirzah S. Lollar & Kevin M. Davis, No Oracle Could Have Foreseen 
Oracle’s FCPA Settlement, LAW360 (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
375113/no-oracle-could-have-foreseen-oracle-s-fcpa-settlement. 
 70 See, e.g., Thomas Fox, Are FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Defenses 
Becoming Obsolete?, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015, 7:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/
3/9/are-fcpa-books-and-records-and-internal-controls-defenses-be.html; Mike Koehler, The 
Dilution of FCPA Enforcement Has Reached a New Level with the SEC’s Enforcement Action 
Against Oracle, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 17, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-dilution-of-
fcpa-enforcement-has-reached-a-new-level-with-the-secs-enforcement-action-against-oracle; 
Michael Volkov, Stretching the FCPA: The Danger of the Oracle Case, VOLKOV (June 27, 2013), 
http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2013/06/stretching-the-fcpa-the-danger-of-the-oracle-case. 
 71 See SEC Settles Charges Against Invision Technologies for $1.1 Million for Violations of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 
2187, 88 SEC Docket 2206 (Feb. 14, 2005). 
 72 See Oracle Complaint, supra note 65, at 5. 
 73 Id. 
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distributor’s margin against the end user price to ensure excess 
margins were not being built into the pricing structure.  
  In addition, although Oracle maintained corporate policies 
requiring approvals for payment of marketing expenses, Oracle failed 
to seek transparency in or audit third party payments made by 
distributors on Oracle India’s behalf. This control would have 
enabled Oracle to check that payments were made to appropriate 
recipients.74 
The Oracle case underscored the fact that the FCPA is a strict 
liability statute and lack of knowledge of a violation does not protect a 
parent company from liability based on acts of its subsidiary. This 
concept was underscored in 2015 with the enforcement action against 
Mead Johnson, detailed below.75 
3.     Mead Johnson 
In another matter involving improper activity that occurred at a 
foreign subsidiary, the SEC issued an administrative cease and desist 
order against Mead Johnson, a global manufacturer and marketer of 
infant formula, and fined the company $12 million in July 2015.76 In 
that case, the SEC alleged the following: 
  The conduct at issue relates primarily to the misuse of marketing 
and sales funds in China. Despite prohibitions in the FCPA and 
Mead Johnson’s internal policies, certain employees of Mead 
Johnson’s majority-owned subsidiary in China, Mead Johnson 
Nutrition (China) Co., Ltd. (“Mead Johnson China”), made 
improper payments to certain health care professionals (“HCPs”) at 
state-owned hospitals in China to recommend Mead Johnson’s 
nutrition products to, and provide information about, expectant and 
new mothers. These payments were made to assist Mead Johnson 
China in developing its business. For the period from 2008 through 
2013, Mead Johnson China paid approximately $2,070,000 to HCPs 
in improper payments and derived profits therefrom of 
approximately $7,770,000.  
  Mead Johnson China failed to accurately reflect the improper 
payments in its books and records. Mead Johnson China’s books and 
records were consolidated into Mead Johnson’s books and records, 
thereby causing Mead Johnson’s consolidated books and records to 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., Exchange Act Release No. 75532, 2015 WL 4538145 (July 
28, 2015). 
 76 Id. at *1, 5. 
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be inaccurate. Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain an 
adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead Johnson 
China’s operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper 
payments that occurred over a period of years.77 
The SEC’s cease and desist order in this case states in one paragraph that 
“Mead Johnson has established internal policies to comport with the 
FCPA and local laws, and to prevent related illegal and unethical 
conduct.”78 Despite these internal policies, the SEC alleged: 
  Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of 
internal controls over the operations of Mead Johnson China to 
ensure that Mead Johnson China’s method of funding marketing and 
sales expenditures through its distributors was not used for 
unauthorized purposes, such as the improper compensation of 
HCPs. The use of the Distributor Allowance to improperly 
compensate HCPs was contrary to management’s authorization and 
Mead Johnson’s internal policies. Mead Johnson failed to devise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that Mead Johnson China’s funding of 
marketing and sales expenditures through third-party distributors 
was done in accordance with management’s authorization.79 
Like the Oracle case, the Mead Johnson cease and desist order did 
not allege, find, or even infer that anyone at Mead Johnson (the parent 
company) participated or even had knowledge of the improper conduct 
occurring at its China subsidiary.80 And like in the case of Oracle, that 
lack of knowledge formed the basis for the internal controls violation. In 
fact, the only link between the alleged improper action and Mead 
Johnson was that the subsidiary’s “books and records were 
consolidated” into the parent company’s books and records.81 Based on 
this, the SEC alleged that the parent company’s books and records were 
inadequate, and that the parent company “failed to devise and maintain 
an adequate system of internal accounting controls” in its subsidiary 
that would have detected the improper payments to the HCPs.82 
The alarming but subtle shift in the breadth of the statute, as 
manifested in the three examples detailed above, gives rise to a more in-
depth discussion about the potential misuse and overuse of the FCPA 
internal controls provision. These theoretical issues should not be 
overlooked because the implications are wide-reaching. 
 
 77 Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. *2. 
 79 Id. at *3. 
 80 Id.; see also Oracle Complaint, supra note 65. 
 81 Mead Johnson, 2015 WL 4538145, at *1. 
 82 Id.  
WOODY.38.5.3 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2017  2:49 PM 
1744 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:1727 
 
III.     THE PROBLEM WITH OVERENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNAL 
CONTROLS PROVISION 
What is the potential risk with the enforcement of the internal 
controls provision in the absence of anti-bribery violations? This Part 
outlines the many theoretical and procedural issues that arise when the 
SEC does not allege, or cannot find—let alone meet its burden of proof 
should a case go to trial83—any anti-bribery violations, yet proceeds 
with violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA alone. 
The most apparent problem with this scenario is that of 
overenforcement of the statute. Overenforcement is defined broadly as 
occurring when a violator of a legal rule “suffers excessive harm . . . from 
the actual implementation of that rule.”84 Excessive harm in the case of 
overenforcement is harm that is greater than what is required for 
optimal deterrence.85 As Richard Bierschbach and Alex Stein expound 
upon in depth, overenforcement creates two unique problems for the 
doctrine of corporate criminal liability. The first, they contend, is 
market spillover, including the significant extralegal ramifications for 
defendants and employees, such as reputational damage, potential 
debarment, and the subsequent reduction of share price, among 
others.86 The second issue, however, is arguably more important in 
terms of the FCPA and corporate FCPA compliance, and it is that the 
scope of liability to corporations is very broad, and the FCPA is no 
exception.87 Bierschbach and Stein put it succinctly: 
Corporate liability is vicarious and, from the firm’s standpoint, strict. 
A firm can be criminally liable for any crimes committed by its 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment and to 
benefit the firm. . . . So long as the employee was carrying out a job-
related activity, the firm can be liable, even if it expressly prohibited 
the wrongdoing and implemented procedures to prevent it.88 
 
 83 As will be discussed more in-depth later in this Section, most FCPA cases never go to 
trial. There are myriad reasons that companies are reticent to challenge the government to 
prove its burden in these matters, and these are explored in Section III.B.3, infra. 
 84 Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 (2005). 
Bierschbach and Stein state that the “most obvious example” of overenforcement is when the 
legal system erroneously set the penalty for a violation at a level higher than necessary, “such as 
imposing a $5,000 fine on all drivers who exceed a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.” Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 1771–72 (citing Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty 
Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993) (an empirical work 
quantifying reputational costs to firms alleged of committing fraud)). 
 87 Id. at 1772. 
 88 Id. at 1773. 
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The risks associated with this problem of vicarious liability and the 
resulting overenforcement as it pertains to the internal controls 
provision of the FCPA cannot be overstated. No matter what measures 
corporations undertake to ensure compliance with the statute, any 
action by an employee that can be considered as “benefitting the firm” 
and within the scope of the employee’s terms of employment results in 
strict liability to the corporation.89 Although potentially noble in its 
ideals, the internal controls provision, when considered in this lens, 
does not lead to any deterrence of corporate malfeasance. If anything, 
there is real risk that corporations will begin to shirk the costs of 
internal controls compliance because no matter how robust the 
program, they could remain “on the hook” for FCPA liability, as BHPB 
found itself last summer. 
For purposes of this Article, I employ the term overenforcement 
broadly to encompass the above-discussed concept of vicarious liability 
to the firm, and also to cover the over-zealous prosecution of violations 
of the internal controls provision of the FCPA. Specifically, the 
remainder of this Part considers the resulting jurisdictional and 
remedial issues that arise when internal controls violations are charged 
absent bribery charges, the natural overcriminalization of the provision 
as a result, and the inevitable overcompliance by the private sector to 
meet the ever-moving target of sufficient internal controls standards. 
A.     Straying from the Purpose, Jurisdiction, and Allowable 
Remedies 
The FCPA is aimed at eradicating bribery occurring overseas; 
domestic bribery is covered by other sections of the U.S. Code.90 Despite 
its decidedly extraterritorial goals, the extraterritorial application of the 
Act was fairly limited until the 1998 Amendments to the Act.91 The 1998 
Amendments to the FCPA expanded the extraterritorial reach of the 
statute.92 The implications of charging internal controls violations 
without an underlying bribery charge strips away some of the 
justification for the expansive extraterritorial reach of the statute. 
 
 89 See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 781, 809–10 (2011). 
 90 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).  
 91 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2 to -3 (2012)). 
 92 Brown, supra note 42, at 288–89. 
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1.     Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Without the Hook of Foreign 
Bribery 
On the heels of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Convention in 1997 mandating that signatory countries 
adopt legislation to combat global corruption, Congress passed the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act in 1998.93 These 
Amendments broadened the understanding regarding who is 
considered a “foreign official” and, more importantly from a 
jurisdictional standpoint, the Amendments extended the assertion of 
nationality-based jurisdiction to reach acts committed by U.S. nationals 
outside the United States.94 Additionally, jurisdiction was extended to 
foreign nationals (individuals and entities) for an act in furtherance of a 
violation that is committed within the territorial United States.95 The 
government has read this jurisdictional authority very broadly, often 
asserting that any money or email that bounces through a U.S.-based 
server can trigger jurisdiction.96 
Indeed, the internal controls provision actually applies to more 
than simply a publicly traded company. Instead, it applies more broadly 
to all “issuers,” a group not limited solely to U.S. companies.97 Under 
the FCPA definition, issuers are those entities with a class of securities 
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or 
that are required to file reports (periodic or otherwise) under section 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.98 This includes foreign 
entities with American depository receipts listed on a U.S. exchange.99 
Issuers are responsible for their own internal controls, as well as for 
those of their subsidiaries around the world, as was made clear in the 
Oracle case.100 
 
 93 Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302. 
 94 Id. § 2(b)–(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2). 
 95 Id.  
 96 See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011) 
(suggesting that wire transfers through U.S. banks are sufficient to satisfy territorial 
jurisdiction). 
 97 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o(d). 
 98 Id. § 78 dd-1(a). “A company is an ‘issuer’ under the FCPA if it has a class of securities 
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or is required to file periodic and other reports 
with [the] SEC under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL 
DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ENF’T DIV., FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE] (footnote omitted), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf. 
 99 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 98, at 11. 
 100 However, the FCPA does limit the obligations of parent companies with respect to the 
internal controls of subsidiaries and/or affiliates when the parent holds voting power of fifty 
percent or less. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). In these instances, all that is required are good faith 
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It is this extended responsibility for far-reaching, extraterritorial 
conduct that is often the source for expansive FCPA interpretations like 
Oracle, where the conduct occurred at the company’s Indian subsidiary, 
and the parent company had no knowledge of the alleged improper 
conduct. The argument for jurisdiction under the FCPA has always 
been that issuers avail themselves of our markets; therefore, they must 
be subjected to our laws, even if those laws reach to the far corners of 
the earth in which a particular issuer does business.101 Again, keeping in 
mind that the purpose of the FCPA was to eradicate foreign bribery, 
with the accounting provisions as a means to effectuating that end, there 
is a risk that the justification of the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law evaporates when no foreign bribery can be found. The statute then 
morphs from being a foreign bribery prohibition to that of a corporate 
accounting provision that can reach into the books of foreign 
subsidiaries located anywhere in the world. 
2.     Remedies 
The trend in enforcement actions, as detailed in Part II, points to 
the uptick in large settlement amounts extracted by the SEC that consist 
entirely of disgorgement and prejudgment interest without any finding 
of a violation of the anti-bribery provisions.102 According to many 
FCPA scholars, this type of fine is termed “no-charged bribery 
disgorgement.”103 These cases are the consternation of many in the 
 
efforts by the parent to ensure the sufficiency of the subsidiary’s or affiliate’s internal controls. 
Id. In these situations, the liability of the parent is judged on a case-by-case basis by weighing 
all facts presented, with the statute requiring consideration of parental ownership interests and 
“the laws and practices governing the business operations of the country in which such firm is 
located.” Id. 
 101 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Beware the Blowback: How Attempts to Strengthen FCPA 
Deterrence Could Narrow the Statute’s Scope, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE 
CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7) (on file with author) 
(“[I]t remains true that the U.S. government has interpreted its FCPA jurisdiction expansively 
to reach non-U.S. entities, and critics argue that the U.S. government has in fact adopted 
jurisdictional theories that go well beyond what a fair reading of domestic or international law 
would authorize.” (citing Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under 
International Law, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225 (2015) and Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using 
Foreign Relations Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
62 DUKE L.J. 445 (2012))). 
 102 See supra Part II and corresponding footnotes.  
 103 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM FCPA Enforcement 
Action, 9 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) 54 (Jan. 24, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383938. The first of these cases of “no-charged bribery disgorgement” 
was SEC v. Textron Inc., No. 07-cv-1505 (D.D.C. 2007). In that case, the SEC settled the action 
against the Rhode Island-based industrial equipment company for violations of the FCPA in 
relation to the U.N. Oil for Food Program. SEC Files Settled Books and Records and Internal 
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defense bar, as well as some former SEC attorneys, because they 
represent a more punitive settlement rather than an equitable one.104 A 
former associate director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division 
summarized this concept by stating: 
[S]ettlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary anti-
bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as disgorgement is 
predicated on the common-sense notion that an actual, 
jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to procure the revenue 
identified by the SEC in its complaint. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Given the bedrock principle that a court’s equitable power to 
order such a disgorgement goes only as far as the scope of the 
violation, it is difficult to determine how a court could lawfully allow 
disgorgement of profits for uncharged violations without the remedy 
crossing the line into “punishment” for the violations actually 
charged.105 
In order to obtain disgorgement, the government needs to prove a 
causal link between the wrongdoing and the unjust enrichment.106 In 
the case of no-charged bribery disgorgement, there typically is not any 
direct link between profits and allegations of misconduct, rendering the 
fines associated with no-charged bribery cases punitive in nature. The 
FCPA contains very specific guidelines and penalties for violations of 
both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the Act.107 Fines 
imposed for bribery are not part of the SEC’s section 21(d) fining 
 
Controls Charges Against Textron Inc., Litigation Release No. 20251, 91 SEC Docket 1197 
(Aug. 23, 2007). The settlement involved Textron “disgorging” $2.3 million in profits, and 
paying $450,500 in pre-judgment interest. Id. In addition, Textron was forced to pay a civil 
penalty of $800,000 and a $1.1 million fine under a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the 
DOJ. Id. Of the three examples detailed in Part II, supra, only Mead Johnson had to disgorge 
“profits” of $7.7 million. See discussion supra note 77. How the SEC arrives at that number is 
worth considering, but will not be addressed here. For additional commentary about valuation 
of SEC disgorgement amounts, see David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing 
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 507 (2009). 
 104 Disgorgement is a remedy in equity aimed at preventing unjust enrichment and deterring 
illegal conduct. It is not meant as a punitive measure. Paul R. Berger, Steven S. Michaels & 
Amanda M. Ulrich, Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in Internal 
Controls and Books and Records Cases, DEVEBOISE & PLIMPTON L.L.P.: FCPA UPDATE, Aug. 
2011, at 1; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) (“[T]he nature of the violation 
determines the scope of the remedy.”). 
 105 Berger, Michaels & Ulrich, supra note 104, at 1–4 (footnote omitted). 
 106 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 107 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff (2012). 
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authority,108 but were included into the Exchange Act as part of the 1988 
Amendments to the FCPA.109 
Disgorgement, however, is not included in the statute, nor is it 
even mentioned in the original House or Senate reports of 1977, the 
discussion regarding its amendments, or the 1981 U.S. General 
Accounting Office Report.110 The first use of disgorgement in the 
settlement of an FCPA action was in 2004, in the case of SEC v. ABB 
Ltd.111 Since that time, “the SEC has sought disgorgement ‘in virtually 
every’ FCPA enforcement action it has brought.”112 The result of this is 
that companies are being fined under the auspices of having received ill-
gotten gains. 
By definition, disgorgement should not be a punitive remedy.113 It 
should be used to separate the bad actor from any ill-gotten gains. 
However, disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions seems to serve 
the purposes of both deterrence and retribution: decidedly punitive 
goals. This is problematic when there are no ill-gotten gains under the 
meaning of the statute; that is, there has not been any contract or 
business retained or obtained through the use of bribes to foreign 
officials, nor has there been any illegal accounting methods to hide those 
bribes. To punish a company for lack of internal controls flies in the face 
of both the purpose of the statute and the remedial options available to 
the government when pursuing these allegations. 
In terms of substantive liability for bribery or inaccurate books and 
records, a company with no internal controls is similarly situated as one 
with robust internal controls, provided no bribery takes place and the 
 
 108 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012). 
 109 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c). 
 110 See Weiss, supra note 103, at 474, 497. Weiss writes that “[t]he history surrounding the 
passage of the FCPA indicates that it is unclear whether Congress intended that the SEC pursue 
disgorgement in FCPA enforcement. This fact alone should at least give pause to question the 
normative function of disgorgement.” Id. at 496. 
 111 Complaint, SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 10-cv-1648 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Sasha Kalb & Marc 
Alain Bohn, An Examination of the SEC’s Application of Disgorgement in FCPA Resolutions, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated. Interestingly, in that case, the 
settlement did not include anti-bribery violations. ABB disgorged $5.9 million to settle books 
and records and internal controls violations. See ABB Settles Federal Court Action and Agrees 
to Disgorge $5.9 Million in Illicit Profits, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release 
No. 2049, 83 SEC Docket 849 (July 6, 2004). 
 112 Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 982 (2010). 
Koehler explains that there is an “intuitive appeal” to disgorgement in enforcement actions 
charging violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the Act. Id. Yet the SEC’s use of the 
disgorgement remedy is routine, regardless of whether the action involves only violations of the 
accounting provisions in the absence of anti-bribery violations. Id. 
 113 Weiss, supra note 103, at 485 (“While disgorgement can serve deterrence purposes, it is 
intended not to compensate the wronged party or to serve as a complete stand-in for the 
deterrent effects of fining, but to recover the benefits of a wrongful act.”). 
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books and records are properly managed and transparent. One cannot 
avoid the discussion of proportionality in terms of fines for only internal 
controls violations versus the fines for the anti-bribery and books and 
records violations.114 Indeed, much has been written in the academic 
literature about proportionality as a principle of punishment and a tool 
for deterrence, but this discussion is often framed in terms of the harm 
suffered or amount of unjust enrichment.115 For internal controls 
violations, however, neither is present (harm or unjust enrichment). 
Does it not logically follow that any fines associated with a failure to 
establish internal controls be reflective of this fact: there was no harm 
done and no unjust enrichment received? 
B.     Overcriminalization 
The three examples detailed in Part II suggest that the current 
enforcement tactics for FCPA violations are trending toward 
overcriminalization. Overcriminalization is broadly defined as “the 
overuse and misuse of the . . . law to punish conduct traditionally 
deemed morally blameless.”116 Overcriminalization results in 
enforcement of laws that cover “more conduct than anyone really 
wishes to punish.”117 Although SEC enforcement actions are, by 
definition and institutional design, civil proceedings, the concept of 
overcriminalization is equally applicable with respect to civil SEC 
enforcement actions as it is to criminal actions. There are three areas in 
which overcriminalization can be seen. First, the SEC as an agency, and 
certainly when investigating potential FCPA violations, has become 
much more of a prosecutorial institution than a remedial one. Second, 
the standard for sufficient internal controls has shifted within the 
rhetoric of the SEC and DOJ, making it more difficult for companies’ 
internal controls to pass muster and elude penalty. Third, there is a 
 
 114 Indeed, other countries have encapsulated the normative concept of proportionality in 
writing their similar anti-corruption legislation. For example, the German criminal code 
prohibits disgorgement that is “disproportionate to the gravity of the offence [sic] committed 
and to the culpability of the perpetrator.” 7 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER app. 
E-8 § 74b(2), Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2017). 
 115 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Making Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of 
Finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, 1 N. ILL. L. REV. 3, 6–10 (1980); Regina A. 
Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational 
Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109 (2010). 
 116 Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1197–
98 (2015) (quoting Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The 
Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 745 (2014)). 
 117 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 
(2001). 
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substantial lack of judicial precedence within the case law regarding 
enforcement of the internal controls provision, rendering the SEC and 
DOJ as both prosecutor and judge during settlement negotiations. This 
Section will explore these three manifestations of overcriminalization, 
resulting in zealous overenforcement of the internal controls provision. 
1.     The Evolution of the SEC’s Enforcement Division into 
Prosecutorial Body 
In recent history, the Enforcement Division of the SEC has 
swallowed up the agency, both in resources/manpower and in setting 
the tone of the agency.118 It is widely seen as the “police force” for the 
SEC.119 Indeed, the former SEC Chair, Mary Jo White, a former 
prosecutor, underscored that prosecutorial tone when she adopted her 
“broken windows” policy for the agency.120 Yet the SEC is not an arm of 
the Department of Justice. This fact is lost on most corporate officers 
who face the same level of investigation and threat of punishment 
regardless of whether it is the SEC or DOJ that comes calling. In short, 
the Enforcement Division has rendered the SEC an agency with 
overwhelming “police power,” at the expense of being an agency that 
focuses on guidance and remedial measures to keep corporations in 
line.121 
Enforcement of the FCPA is no different; arguably the drastically 
increasing fines and prosecutions for violations of the FCPA since 2000 
have made the FCPA one of the hottest areas in the Enforcement 
 
 118 See generally MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 
(2014); Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2143–44 (2015) (noting 
that agencies may have a tendency to impose the largest penalties even when those penalties do 
not reflect the most serious violation, and explaining that “[t]hese problems are compounded 
when two enforcers [in the case of the FCPA, the DOJ and the SEC] can punish not only the 
same entity, but also the same conduct”). 
 119 See Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global 
Corruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1108–13 (2012).  
 120 Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Securities 
Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013) (quoting George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken 
Windows, ATLANTIC (1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-
windows/304465), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100. The theory 
of “no broken windows” propounds that “when a window is broken and someone fixes it,” a 
message is sent that “disorder will not be tolerated.” Id. However, when a broken window is not 
fixed, it is a “signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” Id. Chair 
White explained that her administration would employ the strategy of “no broken windows” to 
securities laws, just as New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani had done with respect to criminal 
laws when Chair White was the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. 
In other words, Chair White underscored that the SEC would be pursuing even the smallest 
infractions of the securities laws. 
 121 See Black, supra note 119.  
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Division.122 Importantly, these internal controls charges arise from SEC 
enforcement actions, not from recommendations or guidance issued by 
the agency or its less “punitive” departments, such as the Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examination (OCIE).123 Meaning, the 
SEC’s prosecutorial arm, the Enforcement Division, is regulating and 
influencing corporate behavior through punishment, rather than 
providing agency guidance through other means.124 
Yet the hard-charging enforcement of all of the Act’s provisions is 
not in line with the initial intent of the Act. In a speech given in 1981 
that manifested some of the initial and original intent of the statute, the 
then-Chairman of the SEC, Harold Williams, stated the following about 
the FCPA in a speech to the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants: 
The Act’s eventual success or failure will, therefore, depend primarily 
upon business’s response. The Commission’s obligation, in turn, is to 
provide a regulatory environment in which the private sector can 
address these issues meaningfully and creatively. In this regard, we 
must encourage public companies to develop innovative records and 
control systems, to modify and improve them as circumstances 
change, and to correct recordkeeping errors when they occur without 
 
 122 As noted above, since 2010, the SEC has had an FCPA unit within the Division of 
Enforcement. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit 
Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-5.htm; see also Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1265 (2015). Zheng uses the FCPA as a case study in the argument about the revolving 
door between government and private industry. Zheng, supra. Zheng points out that regulators 
who may have their sights set on the revolving door into private practice “have incentives to 
bring more enforcement actions, levy higher penalties, and work to expand the scope of matters 
subject to the agency’s authority.” Id. at 1281; see also Yockey, supra note 2, at 350 (“[A] brief 
scan of all FCPA actions from the past two years reads like a ‘who’s who’ of former government 
attorneys.”). By way of examples, Zheng notes that Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the 
DOJ’s FCPA unit and the “architect” of the DOJ’s modern FCPA program joined Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison L.L.P. for an annual salary of $2.5 million. Id. at 1290–91. 
Similarly, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, and 
who ushered in many of the highest FCPA penalties to date, rejoined Covington & Burling 
L.L.P. at an annual salary of $4 million. Id. at 1291. Indeed, former Chair White also was a 
member of a large New York City law firm, Debevoise & Plimpton L.L.P., prior to joining the 
SEC. Id. at 1266. Ms. White returned to Debevoise & Plimpton in February 2017. Elizabeth 
Olson, Mary Jo White to Rejoin Debevoise & Plimpton, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/dealbook/mary-jo-white-debevoise-
plimpton.html. 
 123 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, supra note 16.  
 124 See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The 
Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (1998) (describing how the SEC 
frequently makes law through enforcement cases rather than through rulemaking). 
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a chilling fear of penalty or inference that a violation of the Act is 
involved.125 
The notion of “encouraging” companies and “correcting errors” 
without “fear of penalty” is more in line with the guiding principles of 
other departments in the agency rather than the “broken windows” 
policies of the Enforcement Division.126 For example, the OCIE 
regularly inspects registered entities, yet does so without playing 
“gotcha” with the regulated entities.127 In fact, Andrew Bowden, the 
former Director of OCIE, regularly told his staff that the department 
was to serve as a lifeguard for the financial industry.128 In keeping with 
that analogy, he made clear that the best lifeguards are not the ones who 
make numerous saves but the ones who never have to make any saves 
because they have properly instructed people on the rules of the pool.129 
Particularly in enforcement of an internal controls provision, the 
agency should look more to the guiding principles espoused by OCIE 
than the zealous prosecution style of the DOJ in shaping its FCPA 
enforcement policies. By its very nature, the internal controls provision 
is meant to be a risk management and prevention provision. Absent the 
“smoke” and “fire” of actual substantive bribery and falsified books and 
records, a violation of internal controls is categorically a harmless 
offense that does not require the full weight and punitive power of the 
SEC or DOJ when calculating the appropriate remedy.130 
In other words, internal controls violations arguably are not 
substantive violations, but instead are violations arising out of the 
potential for other violations. In this way, internal controls violations 
are not even the equivalent of “attempted” crimes—they are simply an 
acknowledgement that if someone did attempt to bribe a foreign official 
or falsify books, she likely could get away with it. To bring the weight of 
the Enforcement Division, or even the DOJ, to bear on these offenses 
with the same zeal and prosecutorial tactics as one would expect for 
substantive violations of the Act seems to stray from the purpose of the 
Act, and the role of the SEC in particular. 
 
 125 KOEHLER, supra note 118, at 153. 
 126 See Mary Jo White, supra note 120. 
 127 See Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations, Speech at the Investment Adviser Association Compliance 
Conference: People Handling Other Peoples’ Money (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541260300. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
WOODY.38.5.3 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2017  2:49 PM 
1754 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:1727 
 
2.     Overcriminalization in Statutory Interpretation 
In the cases of Mead Johnson and BHPB detailed in Part II, the 
internal controls allegation centered on the companies’ “failure to 
prevent or detect” the improper accounting at issue.131 Yet “failure to 
prevent or detect” is not the standard for internal controls as 
enumerated in the statute, and the subtle shift by the SEC and DOJ in 
terminology is not merely semantic, but instead highly problematic. 
As made clear above, the statute requires that every issuer of 
publicly traded securities required to file periodic reports with the SEC 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient 
to provide “reasonable assurances” that: 
 
1. “transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization;” 
2. “transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation 
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such 
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;” 
3. “access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization; and” 
4. “the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences.”132 
 
The statute defines “reasonable assurances” as “such level of detail 
and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct 
of their own affairs.”133 As Chairman Williams noted in his 1981 speech, 
“‘[r]easonableness,’ a familiar legal concept, depends on an evaluation of 
all the facts and circumstances.”134 He also stated: “The Act does not 
mandate any particular kind of internal controls system. The test is 
whether a system, taken as a whole, reasonably meets the statute’s 
specified objectives.”135 
 
 131 Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., Exchange Act Release No. 75532, 2015 WL 4538145 (July 
28, 2015); BHP Billiton Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 74998, 2015 WL 2393657 (May 20, 
2015). 
 132 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 133 Id. § 78m(b)(7). 
 134 Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the SEC 
Developments Conference for American Institute of Certified Public Accountants: The 
Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis (Jan. 13, 1981), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/011381williams.pdf. 
 135 Id. 
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Of course, the statute’s specified objectives with regard to the anti-
bribery provisions are clear. With respect to the accounting provisions 
(books and records, and internal controls), the objectives are as follows:  
The primary thrust of the Act’s accounting provisions, in short, was to 
require those public companies that lacked effective internal controls or 
tolerated unreliable recordkeeping to comply with the standards of their 
better managed peers.136 That is the context in which these provisions 
should be construed. 
Given this background, the standard in recent enforcement actions 
of requiring internal controls that will not “fail to prevent or detect” any 
accounting misstep is much stricter than the original intent of the 
statute. Indeed, Chairman Williams made this exact point: 
The test of a company’s control system is not whether occasional 
failings can occur. Those will happen in the most ideally managed 
company. But, an adequate system of internal controls means that, 
when such breaches do arise, they will be isolated rather than 
systemic, and they will be subject to a reasonable likelihood of being 
uncovered in a timely manner and then remedied promptly. Barring, 
of course, the participation or complicity of senior company officials 
in the deed, when discovery and correction expeditiously follow, no 
failing in the company’s internal accounting system would have 
existed. To the contrary, routine discovery and correction would 
evidence its effectiveness.137 
The recent enforcement actions requiring a much stricter standard 
is the result of overcriminalization, and the statute begins to be but a 
shadow of its former (and the intended) iteration. 
3.     Arbitrariness in Enforcement and Settlements 
Despite a seemingly clear statutory mandate for establishing an 
internal controls regime, there is a fair amount of gray area in terms of 
what constitutes adequate internal controls and compliance procedures. 
This concept was captured in 1983, when the court in SEC v. World-
Wide Coin Investments, Ltd. Stated: “The main problem with the 
internal accounting controls provision of the FCPA is that there are no 
specific standards by which to evaluate the sufficiency of controls; any 
evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective process in which 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
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knowledgable [sic] individuals can arrive at totally different 
conclusions.”138 
There is a wealth of material on best practices for compliance 
programs, but there is no set standard. Following certain industry best 
practices hopefully will ensure that companies evade the ever-watchful 
eye of the regulators, but the lesson of the three cases discussed in Part 
II, Oracle, Mead Johnson, and BHP Billiton, tells a different story. Each 
of those companies either had no knowledge of the improper conduct 
or, in the case of BHP Billiton, took significant measures to reduce any 
liability or exposure to FCPA violations. As a result, there is a modicum 
of randomness in compliance, where certain internal controls and 
compliance systems pass muster in the eyes of the regulator, whereas 
similar systems in other corporations may not. 
Few courts have ruled on FCPA internal control violations because 
most defendants settle, meaning that there is little judicial precedent 
surrounding compliance programs. The downside to looking merely to 
DOJ and SEC settlement agreements for legal standards regarding 
compliance programs is that the settlement agreements have been 
created by prosecutors without judicial oversight. This problem could 
be significantly curtailed if more FCPA cases went to court.139 However, 
in practicality, this concept results in the SEC being able to act as both 
prosecutor and judge, acting without much regard toward previous 
settlements. 
[T]he true lesson of Oracle is not that this particular type of internal 
control is required, but rather that the internal controls provision is 
so broad, and the statutory standard of reasonable assurances so 
subjective, that the SEC has an almost unfettered ability to insist on a 
settlement, including a civil penalty, at the conclusion of virtually any 
FCPA investigation.140 
William Stuntz considered a similar concept in his article about 
overcriminalization and the resulting shift in lawmaking and 
enforcement from the courts to the prosecutors or law enforcers.141 In 
Stuntz’s exposition of overcriminalization, he argues that the 
broadening body of criminal law allows for prosecutors to charge a 
number of violations for a single act, due to the overlapping criminal 
codes.142 In the case of internal controls enforcement, this issue is not 
 
 138 SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
 139 Stephenson, supra note 101 (manuscript at 2–3).  
 140 William J. Stuckwisch & Matthew J. Alexander, The FCPA’s Internal Controls Provision: 
Is Oracle an Oracle for the Future of SEC Enforcement?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2013, at 10, 15. 
 141 Stuntz, supra note 117, at 519. 
 142 Id. 
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one of overlapping criminal codes so much as it is enhanced 
investigation and punishment of conduct (or the lack of conduct, i.e., 
establishing sufficient internal controls) that is wholly allowable because 
no substantive violation has occurred. 
As such, SEC enforcement attorneys are able to shape the entire 
landscape of statutory enforcement.143 They decide what actions 
constitute a violation of the code by being the ultimate decision-makers 
regarding whether to investigate, whether to bring an enforcement 
action, and whether and for what amount to settle the action.144 All of 
this occurs without judicial review, up until acceptance of the settlement 
action by the court.145 The ability to cherry-pick cases, and the arbitrary 
nature of settlement agreements without any precedential value, results 
in a lack of checks and balances (and, arguably, due process146) for a 
corporate defendant unwilling to take its chances in court for any 
number of reasons.147 
C.     The Result of Overenforcement: Overcompliance 
Overcriminalization of the statute and overenforcement of the 
internal controls provision has created a necessary culture of 
compliance among many large issuers. Neither the DOJ nor the SEC has 
explicitly stated what a model compliance program must contain to 
satisfy the internal controls requirement.148 Both have, however, 
indicated in settlement decisions and non-prosecution agreements 
(NPA) when companies have satisfied or failed to satisfy the standard. 
 
 143 See Yockey, supra note 2, at 332–33 (citing David Hess, Combating Corruption Through 
Corporate Transparency: Using Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L 
L. 42, 62–63 (2012)). 
 144 Minzner, supra note 118 (outlining the vast discretion afforded to enforcing agencies 
when making charging decisions). 
 145 Of course, after Rakoff’s decision to reject the Citigroup settlement was overturned by 
the Second Circuit, judicial review of settlements is very limited. See SEC v. Citigroup Global 
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 146 The notion that the arbitrary nature of the settlement agreements is a violation of due 
process is beyond the scope of this Article. It will be further explored in my future scholarship. 
 147 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 
(2007). DPAs and NPAs are highly desirable because they do not ascribe any fault to the 
company. Thus, companies that need to do business with the government will not be de-barred 
because they do not plead guilty. Further, a recent court in France held that DPAs and NPAs 
render companies off-limits for foreign prosecution; whereas if a company pleads guilty to only 
one particular charge, a foreign government can prosecute other potential charges without 
violating any double-jeopardy international standards. See Frederick T. Davis, International 
Double Jeopardy: U.S. Prosecutions and the Developing Law in Europe, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
57 (2016) (analyzing the recent French decisions in the Oil-for-Food scandal).  
 148 See Yockey, supra note 2, at 341 (“While the FCPA does contain a few specific rules, it is 
primarily a principle-based statute.”). 
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However, the arbitrariness in the enforcement of the internal controls 
provision results in a real risk of overcompliance, as vast resources are 
spent on compliance systems that may be either insufficient in the eyes 
of the regulators, or worse, wholly ineffective. In a law review Article 
dissecting the effectiveness of corporate compliance as compared with 
the normative goals of compliance, Kimberly Krawiec points out that 
corporate compliance is not a fail-safe measure to prevent bad acts by 
corporate employees:  
In fact, a growing body of evidence indicates that internal 
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms 
and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both 
market legitimacy and reduced legal liability. This leads to two 
potential problems: (1) an under-deterrence of corporate 
misconduct, and (2) a proliferation of costly—but arguably 
ineffective—internal compliance structures.149 
Krawiec buttresses her argument by pointing out that there is 
insufficient empirical evidence to conclude that compliance systems, 
including ethical codes of conduct, are effective as a means of deterring 
malfeasance.150 
In his 1981 speech, then-Chairman Williams made a prescient 
observation about the future of compliance with the Act:  
[U]ncertainty can have a debilitating effect on the activities of those 
who seek to comply with the law. My sense is that, as a consequence, 
many businesses have been very cautious—sometimes overly so—in 
assuring at least technical compliance with the Act. And, therefore, 
business resources may have been diverted from more productive 
uses to overly-burdensome compliance systems which extend beyond 
the requirements of sound management or the policies embodied in 
the Act. The public, of course, is not well served by such reactions.151 
Compliance is very forward-looking in its risk-assessments and 
structures. However, compliance systems also are informed by the most 
recent regulatory actions. As such, they are inherently reactive to 
regulatory action. In this way, they may be a house of cards doomed to 
fail because those who skirt compliance measures do so in continually 
novel ways. 
The DOJ and SEC have been reluctant to define the exact content 
of an FCPA compliance program because they want companies to 
continuously improve their compliance programs when their programs 
 
 149 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003). 
 150 Id. at 510. 
 151 Williams, supra note 134.  
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are either found to be ineffective or the industry adopts better standards. 
In the DOJ’s NPA with IAP Worldwide Services Inc., the DOJ settled 
without prosecution partly because IAP promised to take remedial 
compliance measures, which included conducting periodic reviews and 
testing of anti-corruption measures and policies to maintain 
effectiveness and improve with recent developments.152 By requiring 
measures like this, it is difficult to establish a definitive program that 
will satisfy the internal controls requirement. For example, a compliance 
program deemed effective and sufficient today may be found to be 
ineffective or outdated in the future, particularly if a company falls 
behind changing standards for compliance within its field. 
In addition, as noted above, compliance is inherently a corporate 
cost-benefit exercise. 
Companies may be willing to enter into such settlements—
particularly because, in the absence of a parallel DOJ action, they 
need not make any factual admissions (due to the “neither admit nor 
deny” nature of SEC settlements in such circumstances), and the cost 
of a settlement is often lower than continuing investigative and 
representative costs. But such settlements can have severe, 
unintended consequences. Perhaps most significantly, these 
settlements can lead other companies to misdirect their scarce 
compliance resources.153 
There are certain aspects of compliance programs that serve as the 
pillars of internal controls, including corporate codes of conduct,154 in-
 
 152 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, IAP Worldwide Services Inc. Resolves Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (June 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iap-
worldwide-services-inc-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation. 
 153 Stuckwisch & Alexander, supra note 140, at 15. 
 154 The corporate code of conduct provides specific expectations for employees dealing with 
situations that pose potential violations, such as gift giving, foreign travel, hospitality offers, and 
working with foreign companies. Corporate policy statements are not effective without 
enforcement mechanisms to back them up, and it is clear that the SEC and DOJ consider such 
statements to be an important indication of whether a company is taking compliance seriously 
and communicating to its employees that it is a priority. See, e.g., Complaint at 13, SEC v. 
Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012) (“Morgan Stanley required each of its 
employees . . . annually to certify adherence to Morgan Stanley’s Code of Conduct, which 
included a portion specifically addressing corruption risks and activities that would violate the 
FCPA.”); cf. Siemens Complaint, supra note 22, at 10 (faulting Siemens’s internal controls 
program because the “tone at the top . . . was inconsistent with an effective FCPA compliance 
program and created a corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated”); see also Order 
Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, FLIR Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74673 (Apr. 8, 2015) (finding a violation 
of internal controls provision despite the existence of a generic code of conduct because there 
were not any policies in place to govern the use of foreign travel agencies or gifts to customers). 
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house training,155 reporting,156 structural independent oversight,157 
regular monitoring of activities,158 due diligence,159 and risk 
 
 155 Establishing internal ethics policies and a code of conduct is fruitless unless the policies 
are clearly communicated to employees. The training that employees receive is a significant 
factor in the DOJ’s and SEC’s assessment of internal controls. See, e.g., Order Instituting Cease-
and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Bruker 
Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 73835, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release 
No. 3611 (Dec. 15, 2014) (stating that the fact that the training materials were not translated 
into local languages, including Mandarin, was a key component in the failure of the compliance 
system and, although the company had implemented an FCPA policy, it relied on China-based 
managers to ensure that employees understood the policies and employee handbooks). 
 156 Self-reporting FCPA violations to the SEC and DOJ has frequently been cited as a major 
consideration in reducing penalties or finding that the company’s internal controls were 
sufficient. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ralph Lauren Corporation Resolves 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $882,000 Monetary Penalty 
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2013/ralph-lauren-
corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-to-pay-882-000-
monetary-penalty; Declination Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Criminal Div., to Luke Cadigan, Counsel for Nortek, Inc. (June 3, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865406/download; Declination Letter from Daniel Kahn, 
Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Josh Levy & Ryan Rohlfsen, Counsel for 
Akamai Techs., Inc. (June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865411/
download. In addition, in each of the six examples of past declinations to prosecute included in 
the FCPA Resource Guide, the companies involved had self-reported their violations. See FCPA 
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 98, at 77–79. For example, the SEC and DOJ gave considerable 
weight to Bio-Rad’s voluntary self-reporting of an FCPA violation—reducing the company’s 
criminal fine from $40 million (100% of the disgorgement amount) to $14 million (about forty 
percent). See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 73496, 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3594 (Nov. 4, 2014); Andrew Ceresney, 
Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Remarks at CBI’s Pharmaceutical Compliance Congress in Washington, 
D.C.: FCPA, Disclosure, and Internal Controls Issues Arising in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch030315ajc.html#_ftn10. 
 157 Employees who are given authority to approve improper payments related to their own 
business dealings often have a stronger interest in the immediate business advantage that the 
payment might represent than in adhering to abstract FCPA compliance policies. The 
mitigation of this risk is often hiring independent compliance personnel, so that those who 
approve foreign expenditures and gifts are far removed from the business interests at stake. See 
generally R. Christopher Cook, The Elements of an Effective Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Compliance Program, JONES DAY (Mar. 2006), http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/
publicationdetail.aspx?publication=3208. 
 158 Monitoring, typically through approval of expenditures and audits, has frequently been 
discussed by the SEC as a significant part of effective internal controls. See FCPA RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 98, at 40. The SEC also often requires the company to hire an approved 
independent monitor to periodically report back to the SEC on compliance for a period of time 
following a violation as a remedial measure in settlement agreements. See, e.g., Consent of 
Defendant ABB Ltd. at 2, SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2004); Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges 
Against Innospec, Inc. for Engaging in Bribery in Iraq and Indonesia with Total Disgorgement 
and Criminal Fines of $40.2 Million (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2010/lr21454.htm (requiring corporate monitor). As explained above, in Oracle, the SEC 
alleged that the parent company had failed to account for the $2.2 million difference from what 
its subsidiary was paid ($6.7 million) and the revenue it actually received ($4.5 million)—this 
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assessments,160 among others. All of these undertakings come at varying, 
and likely significant, costs to companies.161 The cost of compliance was 
 
“parked” money was allegedly reserved to make future improper payments to third parties. 
Oracle Complaint at 4, supra note 65. The SEC found that this large disparity in payments 
should have been a red flag for the company’s monitors and subjected to audits and an internal 
investigation, but instead went unnoticed. Id. at 5; see also Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist 
Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 6, Stryker Corp., 
Exchange Act Release No. 7751 (Oct. 24, 2013) (“In many instances, even a cursory review of 
the underlying documentation, such as travel authorization forms and itineraries, would have 
revealed the illegitimate nature of the payments.”). 
 159 The use of third parties, agents, and vendors, particularly intermediaries in deals with 
foreign companies or governments, is often highlighted by both the DOJ and SEC in their 
respective enforcement and prosecutorial press releases. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and 
Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-
ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-bribery-conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213; Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Liquor Giant Diageo with FCPA Violations 
(July 27, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-158.htm. The FCPA Resource 
Guide notes that although due diligence requirements will be different based on the industry, 
the country, and the nature of the transaction, several guiding principles will always apply. 
Companies should (1) understand the qualifications and associations of third-party partners, 
(2) understand the business rationale for including a third party in transaction, and (3) 
undertake some form of ongoing monitoring for third-party relationships. FCPA RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 98, at 60. For example, in an enforcement action against Alcoa, the SEC 
faulted the company for lacking internal controls to detect and prevent FCPA violations, and 
noted in particular that  
 Despite the red flags inherent in this arrangement [a proposed business deal that 
would be routed through a local third party], [Alcoa’s] in-house counsel approved 
the arrangement without conducting any due diligence or otherwise determining 
whether there was a legitimate business purpose for the use of a third party 
intermediary.  
Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, at 5, Alcoa Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71261, Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3525 (Jan. 9, 2014). Companies are also required to conduct 
due diligence as part of any merger or acquisition. As with third parties, the level of due 
diligence required should be determined by completing a risk assessment covering corruption 
risk factors (country, industry, level of regulatory exposure, etc.). Companies should also 
determine whether the company to be acquired previously fell under SEC or DOJ jurisdiction, 
as they will incur successor liability for past FCPA violations. Companies will not, however, 
incur successor liability when acquiring foreign firms that were not previously subject to the 
FCPA. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 98, at 29. Where due diligence is not possible prior 
to an acquisition, however, the DOJ has stated that it will not hold companies accountable for 
violations that occur pre-acquisition or up to 180 days post-acquisition, in order to give the 
acquiring company time to conduct post-acquisition due diligence. See Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Opinion Procedure Release, FCPA Op. No. 08-02 (Dep’t of Justice June 13, 2008), 
WL 2008 2608051. Halliburton was one of several companies bidding to acquire a British 
company, and couldn’t conduct due diligence before it actually won the bid and acquired the 
company. Id. 
 160 A risk assessment determines the level of caution needed in other areas of the compliance 
program (such as how much due diligence is needed for dealing with third-party agents). A 
risk-based compliance approach allows companies to prioritize resources by implementing 
stronger controls where they are more exposed to risk and more limited measures in low-risk 
areas. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 98, at 59 (“DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit 
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considered even at the outset of the statute. Former Chairman Williams 
summarized this in his 1981 speech: 
Inherent in this concept [of reasonableness] is a toleration of 
deviations from the absolute. One measure of the reasonableness of a 
system relates to whether the expected benefits from improving it 
would be significantly greater than the anticipated costs of doing so. 
Thousands of dollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving 
hundreds. Further, not every procedure which may be individually 
cost-justifiable need be implemented; the Act allows a range of 
reasonable judgments.162 
The point of this Article is not to diminish the positive strides 
corporations have made in compliance programs, but to point out that 
compliance programs are often shifting in order to meet the standards 
of an increasingly overcriminalized and overenforced provision of a 
statute. As such, compliance professionals and counsel must continually 
change guidelines, but without the benefit of “hard” precedence. 
Instead, they rely on the “soft” precedence of settlement agreements, as 
well as increasingly stricter standards for internal controls measures, 
and a playing field that is decidedly a home-court advantage for the 
regulators. The natural follow-on result to this is an increasingly robust 
and expensive compliance regime that still may not pass muster in the 
eyes of the regulators due to the strict liability nature of the statute and 
the rigorous enforcement regime in place. 
IV.     THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: WHERE OVERENFORCEMENT OF THE 
INTERNAL CONTROLS PROVISION LEADS 
Overenforcement of the internal controls provision by the SEC has 
potentially major ramifications, including expanded scrutiny of 
 
to a company that implements in good faith a comprehensive, risk-based compliance program, 
even if that program does not prevent an infraction in a low risk area because greater attention 
and resources had been devoted to a higher risk area.”). Risk is determined using a variety of 
factors, including the notoriety of corruption within a country (i.e., Nigeria vs. Denmark), the 
value of the transaction, the industry involved, and whether parties to the transaction are 
government-owned entities. See, e.g., United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 929 (11th Cir. 
2014) (noting that a company would be considered government-owned where it had been 
“overwhelmingly majority-owned by the state, had no [treasury] independent of the state, had a 
state-sanctioned monopoly for its activities, and was controlled by a board filled exclusively 
with government-appointed individuals”). 
 161 See Minzner, supra note 118, at 2143 (“Quite naturally, large penalties will get the most 
attention and the greatest efforts at compliance.”). As a result, companies’ compliance 
programs will be reactive to the most recent, and likely largest, penalties meted out by the 
government. 
 162 Williams, supra note 134. 
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international corporations by the DOJ, as well as expanded 
interpretation of the requisite knowledge for criminal liability. In 
addition, the corporate enforcement actions to date, as well as the tone 
set by the regulators in recent memoranda163 and speeches,164 signal that 
individuals will not escape investigation or liability for internal controls 
violations. 
A.     Corporate Criminal Liability for Internal Controls Violations 
Absent Bribery Violations 
Although the SEC has brought civil charges against companies and 
individuals with internal controls violations in FCPA matters since 
1996, the DOJ first brought criminal charges against a company for an 
internal controls violation in 2008.165 Since the Siemens prosecution in 
2008, the DOJ has increasingly charged internal controls violations, in 
conjunction with the SEC. 
As noted above, to be held criminally liable, one must “knowingly” 
circumvent or fail to implement a system of internal accounting 
controls.166 The government, however, has taken a broad interpretation 
of the knowledge requirement, and has interpreted the knowledge 
requirement as including “corporate knowledge.”167 For example, the 
government has already begun to expand liability of parent corporations 
 
 163 See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
dag/file/769036/download. The “Yates Memo,” as it has come to be known, stresses six areas of 
focus for the DOJ and SEC in investigating individuals for corporate wrongdoing. They are as 
follows: (1) corporations will be eligible for cooperation credit only if they provide DOJ with 
“all relevant facts” relating to all individuals responsible for misconduct, regardless of seniority 
level; (2) both criminal and civil DOJ investigations will focus on investigating individuals 
“from the inception of the investigation”; (3) criminal and civil DOJ attorneys should be in 
routine communication with each other, notifying civil counterparts when conduct giving rise 
to potential individual liability is discovered; (4) the DOJ will not agree to a corporate 
resolution that provides immunity for potentially culpable individuals unless there are 
extraordinary circumstances present; (5) the DOJ will have a clear plan to resolve open 
investigations of individuals when the case against a corporation is resolved; and (6) civil 
attorneys, in addition to criminal attorneys, should focus on individuals and take into account 
issues such as accountability and deterrence, as well as ability to pay fines. Id. 
 164 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell 
Delivers Remarks at the Second Annual Global Investigations Review Conference (Sept. 22, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-
remarks-second-annual-global-0 (clarifying and elaborating on the Yates Memo). 
 165 Siemens Complaint, supra note 22. 
 166 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2012). 
 167 See, e.g., Complaint at 12–13, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 09-cv-0672 (D. 
Utah July 31, 2009) [hereinafter Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Complaint] (using control person 
theory to impute corporate knowledge upon executives). 
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for the acts of their subsidiaries, even in cases where the parent 
corporation has no knowledge of the subsidiaries’ corrupt actions, such 
as in Oracle.168 
In a recent FCPA criminal enforcement action, United States v. 
Weatherford International Ltd., the DOJ alleged in its criminal 
information that Weatherford knowingly failed to establish an effective 
system of internal accounting controls designed to detect and prevent 
corruption, including FCPA violations.169 In particular, the DOJ alleged 
that Weatherford did not establish sufficient controls related to (a) anti-
corruption due diligence on third parties, joint ventures, and 
acquisitions; (b) gifts, travel, and entertainment expenses; (c) employees’ 
ethics and compliance violations; and (d) foreign subsidiaries’ 
activities.170 The DOJ stated in its criminal information that 
Weatherford, despite being a large and complex company with 
substantial FCPA risk, did not have a dedicated compliance officer or 
compliance personnel, nor did it have any anti-corruption training.171 
Weatherford, for all intents and purposes, had taken measures to effect 
FCPA compliance. Because the case settled with a DPA, one may never 
know if the government could have met its burden of proving 
knowledge and intent to violate the internal controls provision of the 
statute, yet this is an important fact to consider. 
Also in 2013, the DOJ charged Total S.A. with a myriad of FCPA 
violations, including internal controls violations.172 Specifically, the DOJ 
 
 168 The same can be said of a more recent enforcement action against Ralph Lauren 
Corporation. Although settled as an NPA, and heralded as a victory for the defense and a 
roadmap for companies under government scrutiny, Ralph Lauren Corporation paid $882,000 
to resolve the allegations. In that matter, however, there was no evidence that the parent 
corporation was aware of the payments made by its Argentinian subsidiary. See Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ralph Lauren Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Investigation and Agrees to Pay $882,000 Monetary Penalty (Apr. 22, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crm-456.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation 
Involving FCPA Misconduct (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-
65.htm. 
 169 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 10–12, United States v. Weatherford Int’l Ltd., No. 
13-cr-733 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Weatherford DPA]. Weatherford entered into 
a deferred prosecution agreement for its FCPA anti-bribery provision and internal control 
provision violations. Weatherford paid the DOJ a criminal fine of $87.2 million in November 
2013. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Subsidiaries of Weatherford International 
Limited Agree to Plead Guilty to FCPA and Export Control Violations (Nov. 26, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-subsidiaries-weatherford-international-limited-agree-plead-
guilty-fcpa-and-export.  
 170 Weatherford DPA, supra note 169, at 4–5. 
 171 Id. at 5. Although Weatherford had an anti-corruption policy, it was only available in 
English and not translated into any other languages. Id.  
 172 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Total, S.A., No. 1:13-CR-239 (E.D. Va. 
May 29, 2013). Total entered a DPA for its FCPA related charges. Id. 
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alleged that Total “knowingly circumvented and knowingly failed to 
implement a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that transactions and dispositions of Total’s assets 
complied with applicable law.”173 In support of this allegation, the DOJ 
stated that Total: 
(a) failed to implement adequate anti-bribery compliance policies 
and procedures; (b) failed to maintain an adequate system for the 
selection and approval of consultants; (c) failed to conduct adequate 
audits of payments to purported consultants; (d) failed to establish a 
sufficiently empowered and competent corporate compliance office; 
(e) failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the company’s 
compliance and ethics program was followed; (f) failed to evaluate 
regularly the effectiveness of the company’s compliance and ethics 
program; (g) failed to provide appropriate incentives to perform in 
accordance with the compliance and ethics program; (h) concealed 
the consulting agreements’ true nature and true participants; (i) 
performed no due diligence concerning the named or unnamed 
parties to these agreements; and (j) lacked controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that the consulting agreements 
complied with applicable laws.174 
Like Weatherford, Total settled the investigation through a DPA, 
which did not require the government to prove any of its allegations.175 
Of course, if Total had taken absolutely zero steps toward compliance, a 
criminal charge for knowing violations of the internal controls 
provision would be appropriate. Yet, Total is a multinational 
corporation whose actions, as described above in the criminal 
information, were no different than the majority of other multinational 
oil companies working in Iran during that time. 
As discussed above in Part III, the requirements for satisfying 
internal controls provisions are fairly nebulous. Nevertheless, the list of 
compliance steps that both Weatherford and Total were alleged to have 
failed to take arguably gives some parameters about what the 
government expects with regards to compliance programs. This is an 
alarming precedent, albeit only suggestive because the cases settled 
without going to trial. Nonetheless, it is clear that the DOJ is getting in 
 
 173 Information at 13, Total, S.A., No. 1:13-cr-239. 
 174 Id. at 13–14. The SEC’s cease and desist order against Total included the same facts and 
allegations. Total, S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 69654, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3461, 2013 WL 2326682 (May 29, 2013).  
 175 There was speculation for some time that Total would be the first company to hold the 
SEC and DOJ to their respective burdens of proof and go to trial. See Mike Koehler, Friday 
Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-45. 
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the game of strong-arming defendants for violations of internal controls 
provisions despite evidence of existing compliance programs. 
B.     Individual Liability for Internal Controls Violations 
Of course, internal controls charges are not limited to corporate 
actors, but also can be levied against individuals.176 Like all of the FCPA 
enforcement actions to date, there has not been any enforcement action 
against an individual that is based solely on a violation of the internal 
controls provision. Rather, these violations are often charged in 
conjunction with other related charges of either the anti-bribery or 
books and records provisions.177 Nevertheless, there is a valid concern 
that the government might hold individuals, particularly executives, 
liable for internal controls violations without any bribery occurring, and 
potentially without any violation of the books and records provision. 
By way of example, in 2009, the SEC took a novel and aggressive 
approach against executives at Nature’s Sunshine Products for 
violations of internal controls.178 These executives were not directly 
involved in any other FCPA violation but were implicated for their 
alleged knowledge of improper payments made by subordinates to 
Brazilian customs officials.179 The SEC charged the executives based on 
control person liability, alleging that they failed to (1) adequately 
supervise their personnel, (2) ensure accurate books and records were 
kept, and (3) ensure that proper internal controls were being 
maintained. In charging the executives under the control person liability 
theory,180 the SEC did not allege that the executives had personal 
 
 176 See, e.g., SEC v. Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (former Morgan Stanley 
executive charged with FCPA violations and Investment Advisor fraud); SEC v. Turner, No. 
1:10-cv-01309 (D.D.C. 2010) (former business director at Innospec, Inc. and Iraqi agent 
charged with FCPA violations); SEC v. Benton, No. 09-cv-03963 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (former 
officer of Pride International, Inc. charged with FCPA violations relating to bribes paid to 
foreign officials in Mexico and Venezuela); Hatoum, Exchange Act Release No. 74112, 
Accounting and Enforcement Release No. 3620, 2015 WL 271257 (Jan. 22, 2015) (former 
employee of PBS&J International, Inc. charged with FCPA violations).  
 177 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, No. 12-CR-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Complaint, SEC v. 
Sharef, No. 11-cv-9073 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2011). 
 178 Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Complaint, supra note 167. 
 179 Id. at 7–9. 
 180 Under the control person liability theory, in a majority of circuits, the government is not 
required to plead that the control person has culpable knowledge. See Zachary S. Brez et al., 
Control Person Liability, 5 Bloomberg L. Rep. (BNA) 17 (2011). Rather, a control person can 
raise lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense. Id. Although not the thrust of this Article’s 
argument, control person liability can affect a number of seemingly uninvolved corporate 
players. For instance, directors may have a risk of liability under control person theory. This is 
because they have a duty to “attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and 
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knowledge of the payments, but instead alleged knowledge due to their 
supervisory position.181 The executives each agreed to pay $25,000 civil 
penalties.182 Prior to Nature’s Sunshine Products, the government had 
not asserted control person liability in FCPA enforcement actions, nor 
has the government brought an enforcement action under control 
person theory since that notable case. 
Nevertheless, the precedent exists in Nature’s Sunshine Products 
that the government may use the mere fact of an individual’s 
supervisory role to impute knowledge of corporate malfeasance, or in a 
less sinister allegation, that the individual should have known that 
controls were insufficient. Given the moving target of what is 
considered “sufficient controls,” particularly after the BHPB case in 
2015,183 the government has the ability to drastically overenforce and 
overcriminalize the internal controls provision as it applies to 
individuals, such as executives or directors. 
CONCLUSION 
The FCPA is a complex and intriguing statute, the enforcement of 
which has evolved drastically since its passage in 1977. Recent 
enforcement actions have put the spotlight on corporate internal 
controls, and seem to forecast that the SEC in particular will aggressively 
pursue internal controls violations in the absence of foreign bribery. 
This trend is troubling because it cuts against the original intent of the 
law. It results in penalties that are not foreseen in the statute, and a 
 
reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under 
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-
compliance with applicable legal standards.” In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Indeed, Delaware case law makes clear that director liability 
exists if there is a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists.” Stone 
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006). Taking the logic from 
the Oracle and Mead Johnson cases, where parent corporations were charged for actions of the 
subsidiaries (of which the parent corporations were unaware), it is not a stretch to assume the 
government may expand individual liability to independent directors, audit committees, or 
other corporate executives who may be unaware of any illegal payments or accounting 
methods. Despite the threat of possible government enforcement, the government has yet to 
levy an internal controls charge against an individual who was not directly involved in 
malfeasance related to the FCPA’s anti-bribery or accounting provisions, or was in control of 
those directly involved, but instead is merely aware of the lack of internal controls in the 
company for which he or she is an independent director. 
 181 Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Complaint, supra note 167. 
 182 SEC Charges Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc. with Making Illegal Foreign Payments, 
Litigation Release No. 21162 (July 31, 2009). 
 183 BHP Billiton Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 74998, 2015 WL 2393657 (May 20, 2015). 
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general overenforcement and overcriminalization of the statutory 
provision. Overenforcement and overcriminalization have a negative 
deterrent effective, and likely will do more harm than good in terms 
fulfilling the statutory purpose of eradicating foreign bribery, and in 
ensuring companies are undertaking reasonable steps to comply with 
the statute and establish robust internal controls. 
